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Abstract
In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be
thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that
each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these
important market design problems, the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA-)mechanism
with responsive strict priorities performs well and economists have successfully implemented
DA-mechanisms or slight variants thereof. We show that almost all real-life mechanisms used in
such environments—including the large classes of priority mechanisms and linear programming
mechanisms—satisfy a set of simple and intuitive properties. Once we add strategy-proofness
to these properties, DA-mechanisms are the only ones surviving. In market design problems
that are based on weak priorities (like school choice), generally multiple tie-breaking (MTB)
procedures are used and then a mechanism is implemented with the obtained strict priorities. By
adding stability with respect to the weak priorities, we establish the first normative foundation
for MTB-DA-mechanisms that are used in NYC.
JEL Classification: D63, D70
Keywords: deferred-acceptance mechanism, indivisible objects allocation, multiple tie-breaking,
school choice, strategy-proofness.
1 Introduction
In centralized entry-level medical markets students search for their first positions at hospitals.
Each year first the finishing students submit a ranking of the available hospital positions and the
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hospitals submit a ranking of the finishing students (and hospitals’ preferences over sets of students
are supposed to be “responsive” with respect to these ranking). Then, the centralized clearinghouse
matches via a mechanism students and hospitals on the basis of the submitted lists. A matching
is stable if (i) every student prefers his match to being unmatched, (ii) every hospital prefers each
matched student to having the position unfilled, and (iii) there is no student-hospital pair that
blocks the matching in the sense that the student prefers the hospital to his match and the hospital
prefers the student to one of its matched students or having the position unfilled.
The American markets (Roth, 1984a) and the British markets in Edinburgh and Cardiff based
the matching on a stable mechanism called hospital-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA-)mechanism
(Gale and Shapley, 1962). Although the DA-mechanism is the predominant mechanism in the
two-sided matching market literature (Roth, 2008), British markets have introduced and operated
unstable mechanisms (Roth, 1991). The markets in Edinburgh (initially), Newcastle, and Birm-
ingham have adopted priority mechanisms in 1966 and 1967, and the markets in Cambridge and
the London Hospital Medical College have adopted linear programming mechanisms in the 1970’s.
The literature on two-sided matching markets has argued that in such markets stable mechanisms
are more successful than others because unstable mechanisms may produce matchings which are
blocked and unsustainable (e.g., Roth, 1991). This is especially due to the fact that both sides
of the market have to be considered as active agents who, after the announced outcome of the
centralized clearinghouse, can resign from positions (students) or fire students (hospitals) in order
to engage in new matches.
In all these markets preferences are private information and agents need to reveal them. Ideally
we would like to base the outcome on the true preferences and construct an incentive compatible
mechanism. Unfortunately there does not exist any stable mechanism that, for all students and for
all hospitals, makes truth-telling a weakly dominant strategy (Roth, 1982). However, the student-
proposing DA-mechanism is strategy-proof for students (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982),
but there does not exist any stable mechanism that is strategy-proof for hospitals with several
positions (Roth, 1984b). This is one of the main reasons why in the mid 1990’s the American mar-
kets changed the mechanism from the hospital-proposing DA-mechanism to the student-proposing
DA-mechanism.
Over the past couple of years, the two-sided matching problem has been adapted to address the
assignment of students to public schools. In a so-called school choice problem, schools correspond
to hospitals and students seek a slot at a school (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). The difference
to a two-sided matching market problem is that a school’s “preference relation” represents priorities
of students to be admitted at that school. These priorities over individual agents are fixed (via
exogenous criteria or objective tests) and cannot be changed. Furthermore, schools are not strategic
agents. Now if priorities are strict (and priorities over sets of students are responsive with respect to
the priorities over individual agents), then the DA-mechanism can be applied in a straightforward
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manner. The same is true for priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms. Indeed, the
famous Boston mechanism for school choice is equivalent to the Edinburgh 1967 priority mechanism
(Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006) and priority mechanisms are nowadays still in use in school choice.1
In school choice, schools are not strategic agents and the motivation for stability needs to
be slightly reconsidered (a school simply cannot deny enrollment to a student who has been as-
signed to it by the central authorities in order to rematch with a preferred student). The intuitive
reinterpretation of stability for school choice problems is that stability property (i) still represents
students’ individual rationality, stability property (ii) corresponds to the non-wastefulness of school
seats, and stability property (iii) captures the fairness property of no justified envy2 (Balinski and
So¨nmez, 1999). Next, several contributions underline the policy importance of strategy-proofness
for school choice mechanisms. The argument there is not simply that truthful revelation of pref-
erences is desirable, but that it is important to level the playing field for students from different
backgrounds. Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth, and So¨nmez (2006) and Pathak and So¨nmez (2008)
show that under the Boston mechanism sophisticated agents were much better off than unsophis-
ticated agents: na¨ıvely truth-telling students (or parents) tend to be the worst off students under
the Boston mechanism, which is not strategy-proof. This is due to the fact that with a manip-
ulable mechanisms it may be difficult to figure out the best (non-truthful) strategy whereas with
a strategy-proof mechanisms each agent’s simple strategy is to report preferences truthfully. In
this paper we formulate some simple and intuitive properties that are satisfied by many mecha-
nisms (using some arbitrary strict priorities) including priority mechanisms, linear programming
mechanisms and responsive DA-mechanisms. However, we show that once strategy-proofness is
added, only the student-proposing DA-mechanisms (with responsive priorities) survive among all
mechanisms satisfying our set of simple and intuitive properties (Theorem 1). This provides a
rationale for using the student-proposing responsive DA-mechanism if truthful revelation of prefer-
ences is important. Furthermore, the feature of responsiveness-to-individual-priorities makes this
mechanism easily applicable in practice (Roth, 2008).3
For some school choice problems priorities may be coarse, e.g., in Boston priorities are divided
into four classes: (i) siblings and walk zone, (ii) siblings, (iii) walk zone, and (iv) the rest. In
extreme cases, no priorities are given and all students have equal rights for receiving any object.
When priorities are weak, in order to apply a (student-proposing) DA-mechanism, one needs to
resolve the ties in some way. Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2009) propose to use a fixed
1In Boston this mechanism has now been changed to the student-proposing DA-mechanism, but many cities
worldwide still use the so-called Boston (or direct acceptance) mechanism.
2A matching eliminates justified envy if whenever a student prefers another student’s match to his own, he has a
lower priority than the other student at that school.
3The search for “good” mechanisms is the subject of many recent contributions, but most of them deal with the
house allocation model where exactly one object of each type is available (e.g., Ehlers, 2002; Ehlers and Klaus, 2006,
2007; Kesten, 2009; Pa´pai, 2000). In most papers that study the allocation of indivisible objects with capacity
constraints, externally prescribed priorities are also specified; the corresponding class of problems is usually referred
to as “school choice problems” or “student placement problems” (see So¨nmez and U¨nver, 2011, for a recent survey).
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multiple tie-breaking procedure (MTB) (which is independent of students’ preferences) and then
apply the DA-mechanism. Erdil and Ergin (2008) propose to use different tie-breaking procedures
for different preference profiles. Both these contributions regard stability (with respect to the weak
priorities) as an important requirement. We show that in Theorem 1, we can replace individual
rationality and weak non-wastefulness with stability with respect to weak priorities, and by doing
so we establish the first normative foundation of responsive MTB-DA-mechanisms as used in NYC
(Theorem 2).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a model of allocating indivisi-
ble objects with capacity constraints and exogenously given priorities. In Section 3 we introduce
tie-breaking procedures for exogenously given priorities, priority mechanisms, linear programming
mechanisms, and responsive DA-mechanisms. In Section 4 we state simple and intuitive properties
for mechanisms. In Section 5 we show that all described real-life mechanisms satisfy our simple
and intuitive properties. We then show that only (agent-proposing) responsive DA-mechanisms
satisfy these simple and intuitive properties and strategy-proofness. For exogenously given pri-
orities, in Section 6, we then obtain a characterization of responsive MTB-DA mechanisms when
imposing stability. The Appendix contains all our proofs and in addition a second characterization
of responsive DA-mechanisms with weak consistency.4
2 Allocation with Priorities and Variable Resources
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote a finite set of agents with n ≥ 2. Let O denote a set of potential (real)
object types or types for short. We assume that O contains at least two elements and that O is
finite.5 Not receiving any real object is called “receiving the null object.” Let ∅ represent the null
object.
Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a preference relation Ri over all types O∪{∅}. The preference
relation Ri is strict, i.e., Ri is a linear order over O ∪ {∅}. Given x, y ∈ O ∪ {∅}, x Pi y means that
agent i strictly prefers x to y (and x 6= y) and x Ri y means that agent i weakly prefers x to y
(and x Pi y or x = y). Let R denote the set of all preferences over O ∪ {∅}, and RN the set of all
(preference) profiles R = (Ri)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R.
Given R ∈ RN and M ⊆ N , let RM denote the profile (Ri)i∈M . It is the restriction of R to the
set of agents M . We also use the notation R−M = RN\M and R−i = RN\{i}.
Given O′ ⊆ O ∪ {∅}, let Ri|O′ denote the restriction of Ri to O′ and R|O′ = (Ri|O′)i∈N . Given
i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R, type x ∈ O is acceptable under Ri if xPi ∅. Let A(Ri) = {x ∈ O : xPi ∅} denote
the set of acceptable types under Ri.
4Our Supplementary Appendix also discusses Kojima and Manea (2010) in relation to our results and provides
the independence of the properties used in our characterizations.
5Our results remain unchanged when O is infinite. For expositional convenience, finiteness of O is assumed.
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For each type x ∈ O, at most qx ∈ N copies are available in any economy with 1 ≤ qx ≤ |N |.6
Let qx, 0 ≤ qx ≤ qx, denote the number of available objects or the capacity of type x. Let
q = (qx)x∈O denote a capacity vector and Q = ×x∈O{0, 1, . . . , qx} denote the set of all capacity
vectors. The null object is always available without scarcity and therefore we set q∅ =∞.
Given type x, let ̂x denote a (weak) priority ordering of type x on N . Here i ̂x j means that
agent i has higher priority than agent j for obtaining an object of type x and i ∼̂x j means that
agents i and j have the same priority for obtaining an object of type x. For each type x, the priority
ordering ̂x is exogenously given. The priority ordering ̂x is strict if for any distinct i, j ∈ N ,
we have either i ̂x j or j ̂x i. Let ̂ = (̂x)x∈O denote a priority structure (e.g., determined
via test/exam scores or other objective suitability criteria). Priority structure ̂ is strict if for all
x ∈ O, priority ordering ̂x is strict. For a strict priority structure ̂ we sometimes write ̂ instead
of ̂. In the sequel, we denote an exogenously given priority structure by ̂ and an arbitrary
strict priority structure by . In some environments no priorities are given (no tests/exams are
conducted). Then all agents have equal priority for any type. We denote the “no or equal priorities”
priority structure by ∼̂, i.e., for all types x and for all i, j ∈ N , i ∼̂x j.
An (allocation) problem (with capacity constraints and priorities) consists of a preference profile
R ∈ RN , a capacity vector q ∈ Q, and a priority structure ̂. Since ̂ is exogenously given and
remains fixed throughout, we often denote a problem by (R, q) and the set of all problems by
RN × Q. Given a capacity vector q, let O+(q) = {x ∈ O : qx > 0} denote the set of available
real types under q. The set of available types is O+(q) ∪ {∅} and includes the null object, which is
available at any problem.
Each agent i is to be allocated exactly one object in O ∪ {∅} taking capacity constraints into
account. An allocation for (capacity vector) q is a list a = (ai)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N ,
ai ∈ O ∪ {∅}, and any real type x ∈ O is not assigned more than qx times, i.e., for all x ∈ O,
|{i ∈ N : ai = x}| ≤ qx. Note that ∅, the null object, can be assigned to any number of agents
and that not all real objects have to be assigned. Let Aq denote the set of all allocations for q and
A = ⋃q∈QAq set of all allocations. Given a problem (R, q) and a ∈ Aq, allocation a is individually
rational if for all i ∈ N , ai Ri ∅.
An mechanism is a function ϕ : RN × Q → A such that for all problems (R, q) ∈ RN × Q,
ϕ(R, q) ∈ Aq. Given i ∈ N , we call ϕi(R, q) the allotment of agent i at ϕ(R, q).
3 Multiple Tie-Breaking and Real Life Mechanisms
For the application of the real-life mechanisms we introduce in this section, we first have to resolve
or break ties. In other words, these mechanisms require the transformation of a weak priority
6By introducing “global upper bounds” via qx (x ∈ O) we can, for instance, specify the house allocation model
where at most one object of each type is available, i.e., for all x ∈ O, qx = 1.
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structure ̂ into a strict priority structure . In applications this is typically done by breaking
the ties for any type. A strict priority structure  is a multiple tie-breaking (MTB) of the (weak)
priority structure ̂ if for any type x and any i, j ∈ N : if i ̂x j, then i x j. Note that then any
tie in ̂ is broken and  respects all strict priorities of ̂. Any MTB of ̂ is strict and we often
use the terminology “for any MTB  of ̂.”
3.1 Priority Mechanisms
Below we describe the large class of priority mechanisms. Any priority mechanism, for each prefer-
ence profile R and any MTB  of ̂, matches sequentially all student-type pairs that have highest
“priority” among all remaining pairs. First, the priority mechanism checks whether there are (1,1)-
matches (i.e., an agent-type pair who ranks each other first). If there are any (1,1)-matches, then
they are realized. Second, the priority mechanism checks whether there are matches that have the
second highest priority (i.e., (1,2)- or (2,1)-matches) and matches any such pair. And so on. Of
course, a match is only realized if the agent prefers his matched object to the null object. Be-
cause priority mechanisms differ in how they exactly prioritize matches, we have just sketched a
class of mechanisms (note the indeterminacy in the above description when mentioning (1,2)- or
(2,1)-matches as having the second highest priority). In particular, the Edinburgh 1967 mechanism
ordered matches lexicographically according to the types’ priorities, that is, (1,1)-matches have first
priority, followed by (2,1), (3,1), and so on. Only when all types’ first choices are exhausted, other
matches ((1,2), (2,2), (3,2), . . .) are considered. We will call any mechanism that orders matches
lexicographically in types’ priorities or in students’ preferences, a lexicographic priority mechanism.
The Boston mechanism for public school choice is a lexicographic priority mechanism (Ergin and
So¨nmez, 2006).
Given an agent’s preference relation Ri, we say that agent i’s most preferred real type has rank 1,
his second most preferred real type has rank 2, etc.. For each x ∈ O, we denote by rank(x,Ri) the
rank of x in Ri. Note that we do not rank the null object. Similarly we define rank(i,x). Given
(R,), we call (i, x) an (a, b)-match if rank(x,Ri) = a and rank(i,x) = b.
A priority function is a one-to-one function g : N× N→ N such that
(i) for all (a, b), (a′, b) ∈ N× N, if a < a′, then g(a, b) < g(a′, b), and
(ii) for all (a, b), (a, b′) ∈ N× N, if b < b′, then g(a, b) < g(a, b′).
The function g associates with each (a, b)-match its priority g(a, b). Hence, in our terminology
an (a, b)-match has higher priority than an (a′, b′)-match if g(a, b) < g(a′, b′).
For each problem (R, q), we will only consider the ranks of available real types under q. Thus,
the priority function will take as inputs the rank information based on the reduced preference profile
R|O+(q)∪{∅}. Then, for each problem (R, q) and any MTB  of ̂, the MTB-priority mechanism
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based on g and  operates on the restricted problem (R|O+(q)∪{∅}, q) and matches sequentially all
agent-type pairs that have the highest priority according to g subject to individual rationality and
the quotas. Let M (g,)(R, q) denote the resulting allocation and let M (g,) denote the priority
mechanism based on g and .
3.2 Linear Programming Mechanisms
A linear programming mechanism assigns to each possible (a, b)-match a positive weight. These
weights are strictly decreasing in both components. A weighting function is a function h : (N ×
N) ∪ {(0, 0)} → R+ such that
(i) h(0, 0) = 0,
(ii) for all (a, b), (a′, b) ∈ N× N, if a < a′, then h(a, b) > h(a′, b), and
(iii) for all (a, b), (a, b′) ∈ N× N, if b < b′, then h(a, b) > h(a, b′).
Recall that rank(x,Ri) denotes the rank of real type x ∈ O in Ri and rank(i,x) the rank of
i ∈ N in x. For all i ∈ N , we now also define rank(∅, Ri) = 0 and rank(i,∅) = 0. Given a
profile R ∈ R and an individually rational allocation a, the score of a is the sum of the weights of





Given a weighting function h, the linear programming mechanism M (h,) chooses for each
problem (R, q) an individually rational allocation for q with maximal score among all individually
rational allocations for q. Let arg max s(h,)(·, R) denote the set of all individually rational alloca-
tions for q that maximize the weighted score s(h,) among all individually rational allocations for q.
We will assume that if there are several allocations maximizing the score under a submitted profile,
then the linear programming mechanism breaks ties uniformly, i.e., each of these maximizers is
chosen with equal probability. In such a case a linear programming mechanism chooses a lottery
over allocations. It is easy to see that this does not create any significant problem and our analysis
can be extended to mechanisms choosing a lottery for each profile.
Let M denote a random mechanism choosing for each problem (R, q) a lottery over Aq. Given
an allocation a for q, let Pr{M(R, q) = a} denote the probability that M assigns to allocation a.
Similarly, given i ∈ N and y ∈ O ∪ {∅}, let Pr{Mi(R, q) = y} denote the probability that i is
assigned to y under the lottery M(R, q).
For each problem (R, q), we will only consider the ranks of available real types under q. Thus,
the weighting function will take as inputs the rank information based on the reduced preference
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profile R|O+(q)∪{∅}. Then, for each problem (R, q) and any MTB  of ̂, the MTB-linear program-
ming mechanism based on h and  operates on the restricted problem (R|O+(q)∪{∅}, q) and for all
individually rational allocations a for q such that
s(h,)(a,R|O+(q)∪∅) = max
a′∈Aq is individually rational
s(h,)(a′, R|O+(q)∪∅),we have
Pr{M (h,)(R, q) = a} = 1| arg max s(h,)(·,R|O+(q)∪∅)| (where |S| denotes the cardinality of set S).
3.3 Stability and Agent-Proposing Responsive DA-Mechanisms
Given the priority structure ̂ and a problem (R, q), we can interpret (R, ̂, q) as a college ad-
missions problem (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) where the set of agents
N corresponds to the set of students, the set of real types O corresponds to the set of colleges,
the capacity vector q describes colleges’ quota, preferences R correspond to students’ preferences
over colleges and not receiving any college, and the priority structure ̂ is taken to represent col-
leges’ responsive preferences over students. Stability is an important requirement for many real-life
matching markets and it turns out to be essential in our context of allocating indivisible objects to
agents.
Stability under ̂: Given (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q, an allocation a ∈ Aq is stable under ̂ if there exists
no agent-type pair (i, x) ∈ N × O ∪ {∅} such that x Pi ai and (s1) |{j ∈ N : aj = x}| < qx or
(s2) there exists k ∈ N such that ak = x and i̂xk.
Note that (s1) implies individual rationality because q∅ = ∞. Furthermore, mechanism ϕ is
stable if there exists a priority structure  such that for each problem (R, q) ∈ RN × Q, ϕ(R, q)
is stable under . When  is strict, we suppose that colleges’ priorities over sets of students are
responsive with respect to  (we discuss responsiveness in detail below in Remark 1).
For any college admissions problem with strict and responsive priorities (R,, q), we denote by
DA(R, q) the agent-optimal stable allocation that is obtained by using Gale and Shapley’s (1962)
agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm, DA-algorithm for short:7 let (R, q,) be given.
Then,
• at the first step of the DA-algorithm, every agent applies to his favorite acceptable type. For
each real type x, the qx applicants who have the highest priority for x (all applicants if there
are fewer than qx) are placed on the waiting list of x, and all others are rejected.
• At the r-th step of the DA-algorithm, those applicants who were rejected at step r− 1 apply
to their next best acceptable type. For each real type x, the qx applicants among the new
7Analogously we may define the type-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm where each type applies at each
step to as many agents as there are objects of this type available.
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applicants and those on the waiting list who have the highest priority for x are placed on the
updated waiting list of x, and all others are rejected.
The DA-algorithm terminates when every agent is on a waiting list or has applied to all ac-
ceptable types. Once the algorithm ends, objects are assigned to the agents on the respective type
waiting lists and the null object is assigned to the agents who are not on any waiting list. The
resulting allocation is the agent-optimal stable allocation for the problem (R, q,), denoted by
DA(R, q).
Responsive DA-Mechanisms: A mechanism ϕ is a responsive DA-mechanism if there exists a
strict priority structure  such that for each (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q, ϕ(R, q) = DA(R, q).
In real life we often take a MTB  of ̂ before applying the DA-mechanism DA. We will call
such a mechanism a responsive MTB-DA-mechanism.
Note that the above condition of stability under  takes only blocking by individual agents and
by agent-type pairs into account. This is sometimes referred to as “pairwise” stability. However,
one may also consider group stability where blocking is allowed by arbitrary groups of agents and
types. For college admissions problems with responsive preferences, pairwise stability and group
stability coincide. In such environments it suffices to know the priority orderings over individual
agents and the implementation of responsive DA-mechanisms is much easier than it would be for
more general college preferences (e.g., substitutable preferences). From now on, we will assume that
priorities are responsive, i.e., we assume that college preferences are responsive in the associated
college admissions problem.8
Remark 1. Responsiveness of Priorities
Let x ∈ O, 0 < qx ≤ |N |, and x be a priority ordering. Let 2Nqx denote the set of all subsets of
N that do not exceed the capacity qx, i.e., 2
N
qx ≡ {S ⊆ N : |S| ≤ qx}. Let Px denote a priority
relation on 2Nqx , i.e., Px strictly orders all sets in 2
N
qx . Then, Px is responsive to x if the following
two conditions hold: (r1) for all S ∈ 2Nqx such that |S| < qx and all i ∈ N \ S, S ∪ {i} Px S and
(r2) for all S ∈ 2Nqx such that |S| < qx and all i, j ∈ N \ S, (S ∪ {i}) Px (S ∪ {j}) if and only if
i x j. When formulating (r1) we implicitly assume that each object finds all agents acceptable.
Let P(x) denote the set of all priority relations that are responsive to x.
Now, given (R, q) ∈ RN × Q and a priority relation profile PO ∈ ×x∈OP(x), an allocation
a ∈ Aq is group stable under PO if there exists no coalition (consisting possibly of both agents and
types) that blocks allocation a.9
8Correspondingly, priorities would be substitutable if college preferences are substitutable in the associated college
admissions problem.
9Formally, given (R, q) and PO, a coalition S ⊆ N ∪O blocks a ∈ Aq if there exists an allocation b ∈ Aq such that
(g1) for all i ∈ S ∩N , bi ∈ S ∩O, (g2) for all i ∈ S ∩N , bi Ri ai, (g3) for all x ∈ S ∩O, i ∈ {j ∈ N : bj = x} implies
i ∈ S ∪ {j ∈ N : aj = x}, (g4) for all x ∈ S ∩ O, {j ∈ N : bj = x} Rx {j ∈ N : aj = x}, and (g5) for at least one
member of S, (g2) or (g4) holds with strict preference.
9
It is known that given (R, q) ∈ RN × Q and a responsive priority relation profile PO ∈
×x∈OP (x), an allocation a ∈ Aq is group stable under PO if and only if a ∈ Aq is stable
under . In other words, group stability is identical with stability for responsive priorities and the
set of group stable matchings is invariant with respect to the responsive preference extensions of
. This implies that for the implementation of any responsive DA-mechanism, we only need to
know the priority orderings over individual agents and not the complete priority relations over sets
of agents. This makes the application of responsive DA-mechanisms very easy and convenient in
real-life matching markets. 
4 Simple and Intuitive Properties
A natural requirement for a mechanism is that the chosen allocation depends only on preferences
over the set of available types. Given a capacity vector q, a type x is unavailable if qx = 0.
Unavailable Type Invariance: For all (R, q) ∈ RN×Q and all R′ ∈ RN such that R|O+(q)∪{∅} =
R′|O+(q)∪{∅}, ϕ(R, q) = ϕ(R′, q).
By individual rationality each agent should weakly prefer his allotment to the null object (which
may represent an outside option such as off-campus housing in the context of university housing
allocation, or private schools or home schooling in the context of student placement in public
schools).
Individual Rationality: For all (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q and all i ∈ N , ϕi(R, q)Ri ∅.
Next, we introduce two properties that require a mechanism to not waste any resources. First,
non-wastefulness (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999) requires that no agent prefers an available object
that is not assigned to his allotment. Note that non-wastefulness corresponds to the first part (s1)
of stability (for any arbitrary priority structure).
Non-Wastefulness: For all (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q, all x ∈ O+(q), and all i ∈ N , if x Pi ϕi(R, q), then
|{j ∈ N : ϕj(R, q) = x}| = qx.
Non-wastefulness is not a weak efficiency requirement in environments where priorities can be
interpreted as preferences because types (or colleges or schools) may be worse off after the departure
of some agents. Or in other words, each type may prefer to have assigned as many objects of this
type as possible (not caring of the identities of the students receiving this type).10 Next, we weaken
non-wastefulness by requiring that no agent receives the null object while he prefers an available
object that is not assigned.
Weak Non-Wastefulness: For all (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q, all x ∈ O+(q), and all i ∈ N , if x Pi ϕi(R, q)
and ϕi(R, q) = ∅, then |{j ∈ N : ϕj(R, q) = x}| = qx.
10This may be due to avoiding the closure of a school or a college and if more positions are filled, then this may
increase the prestige or visibility of the institution.
10
Weak non-wastefulness is a limited efficiency requirement. For example, suppose that a central
agency registers all agents who did not receive anything (or are unemployed) and all those agents
report all real types (or jobs) which are acceptable to them. Then it should not be the case that
some agent who receives nothing prefers one of the available real objects (or available jobs) to the
null object.
Many mechanisms that are used in real life ignore agents’ preferences below their allotments
(e.g., all mechanisms mentioned in Section 3). That is, an allocation does not change if an agent
changes his reported preferences below his allotment. We formulate a weaker version of this invari-
ance property by restricting agents’ changes below their allotments to truncations.
A truncation strategy is a preference relation that ranks the real types in the same way as
the corresponding original preference relation and each real type which is acceptable under the
truncation strategy is also acceptable under the original preference relation. Formally, given i ∈ N
and Ri ∈ R, a strategy R¯i ∈ R is a truncation (strategy) of Ri if (t1) R¯i|O = Ri|O and (t2) A(R¯i) ⊆
A(Ri). Loosely speaking, a truncation strategy of Ri is obtained by moving the null object “up.”
If an agent truncates his preference relation in a way such that his allotment remains acceptable
under the truncated preference relation, then truncation invariance requires that the allocation is
the same under both profiles. The property is quite natural on its own in the sense that the chosen
allocations do not depend on where any agent, who receives a real object, ranks the null object
below his allotment.
Truncation Invariance: For all (R, q) ∈ RN × Q, all i ∈ N , and all R¯i ∈ Ri, if R¯i is a
truncation of Ri and ϕi(R, q) is acceptable under R¯i (i.e., ϕi(R, q) ∈ A(R¯i)) and R¯ = (R¯i, R−i),
then ϕ(R¯, q) = ϕ(R, q).
Our last property applies to problems when two agents compete for the same object in a maximal
conflict situation, i.e., they have the same preference relation with only one acceptable real type
x ∈ O and for the two problems under consideration the preference profiles are identical. Two-agent
consistent conflict resolution then requires that if in these problems one of them receives the object,
the conflict is resolved consistently in that it has to be the same agent in both problems who “wins
the conflict” and receives the object.
We denote a preference relation with only one acceptable type x ∈ O by Rx, i.e., A(Rx) = {x}.
We denote the set of all preference relations that have x ∈ O as the unique acceptable type by Rx.
Two-Agent Consistent Conflict Resolution: For all R ∈ RN , all q, q′ ∈ Q, and all Rx ∈ Rx,
if Ri = Rj = R
x and {ϕi(R, q), ϕj(R, q)} = {ϕi(R, q′), ϕj(R, q′)} = {x, ∅}, then for k ∈ {i, j},
ϕk(R, q) = ϕk(R, q
′).
One can interpret this property as a weak tie-breaking property because it only imposes that the
tie between two agents in very specific maximal conflict situations is broken consistently in favor
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of the same agent. In particular, when considering two different preference profiles R,R′ ∈ RN




j ∈ Rx and
{ϕi(R, q), ϕj(R, q)} = {ϕi(R′, q′), ϕj(R′, q′)} = {x, ∅}), two-agent consistent conflict resolution does
not imply that the same agent (out of i and j) receives object x because the assignment of x may
depend on the other agents’ preferences (i.e., for k ∈ {i, j}, ϕk(R, q) 6= ϕk(R′, q′) is possible).
5 Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference
The properties we have introduced up to now are simple and intuitive. Indeed, our first result
confirms this since all the real-life mechanisms we have described so far satisfy them.
Proposition 1. Let  be a strict priority structure.
(i) For any priority function g, the priority mechanism based on (g,) satisfies unavailable
type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, two-agent consistent conflict
resolution, and truncation invariance.
(ii) For any weighting function h, the linear programming mechanism based on (h,) satisfies un-
available type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, two-agent consistent
conflict resolution, and truncation invariance.
(iii) The responsive DA-mechanism based on  satisfies unavailable type invariance, individual
rationality, weak non-wastefulness, two-agent consistent conflict resolution, and truncation
invariance.
Note that all the properties introduced in Section 4 and used in Proposition 1 ignore the priority
structure ̂. We prove Proposition 1 in Appendix A.
Next we characterize the class of all responsive DA-mechanisms (and not only MTB-DA-
mechanisms). For our characterization of responsive DA-mechanisms we need one more property.
The well-known non-manipulability property strategy-proofness requires that no agent can ever
benefit from misrepresenting his preferences.
Strategy-Proofness: For all (R, q) ∈ RN × Q, all i ∈ N , and all R¯i ∈ R, ϕi(R, q) Ri
ϕi((R¯i, R−i), q).
It turns out that the class of mechanisms satisfying our simple and intuitive properties and
strategy-proofness is very small. With the following characterization, we establish the first norma-
tive foundation for the class of responsive DA-mechanisms.
Theorem 1. Responsive DA-mechanisms are the only mechanisms satisfying unavailable type
invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, two-agent consistent conflict resolution,
truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness.
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It is important to note that priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms satisfy all
properties of Theorem 1 except for strategy-proofness. This demonstrates how weak all properties
in Theorem 1 are, except for strategy-proofness. It is the incentive compatibility property that fa-
vors responsive DA-mechanisms over all other mechanisms. We prove Theorem 1 in Appendix B.11
Appendix C contains a second characterization (Theorem 4) of responsive DA-mechanisms in a
variable agents environment based on individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consis-
tency, and strategy-proofness. Here weak consistency requires that agents receiving the null object
should still receive the null object if some agents leave the economy with their allotments.
Remark 2. (Weak) Non-Wastefulness
Note that if a mechanism is non-wasteful, then (s1) in the definition of stability can never occur and
therefore, non-wastefulness is a partial stability property. However, weak non-wastefulness, even
together with individual rationality, does not imply (s1) and therefore, it is not a partial stability
property. Any mechanism satisfying the properties of Theorem 1 must be stable (under a strict
priority structure). The combination of the properties in Theorem 1 includes weak non-wastefulness
as a partial efficiency requirement, but not as a partial stability property. However, in the above
characterization (and in Theorem 4, Appendix C), weak non-wastefulness may be replaced by non-
wastefulness (without shortening the proofs or altering the independence of the axioms). Note that
similarly to responsive DA-mechanisms, priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms
satisfy weak non-wastefulness, but in contrast to them, they do not satisfy non-wastefulness. 
6 Stability makes a Difference as well
We have seen that among all the mechanisms discussed in this article, responsive DA-mechanisms
are the only strategy-proof mechanisms. However, they are in fact also the only ones that respect
the stability with respect to priorities. Another strategy-proof mechanism that has been discussed
in school choice redesigns is the so-called top-trading cycles mechanism (Shapley and Scarf, 1974).
While in most school choice redesigns (e.g., Boston and New York City) stable DA-mechanisms are
implemented, only San Francisco so far has announced plans to adopt an unstable top-trading cycles
based mechanism. In many applications, stability seems to be an extremely important criterium
as well and it differentiates DA-mechanisms from top-trading mechanisms.
As already mentioned in our introduction, many real life applications of market design, e.g.,
school choice problems, have weak priority structures as inputs (see Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and
Roth, 2009; Erdil and Ergin, 2008). Given a weak priority structure ̂, stability under ̂ imme-
diately implies non-wastefulness and individual rationality. Thus, we obtain the following first
normative foundation for responsive MTB-DA-mechanisms.
11We discuss the independence of properties in Theorem 1 in the Supplementary Appendix.
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Theorem 2. Let ̂ be a (weak) priority structure. Responsive MTB-DA-mechanisms are the only
mechanisms satisfying stability under ̂, unavailable type invariance, two-agent consistent conflict
resolution, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness.
A special case of a weak priority structure is the one where all agents have equal priorities for
all objects (or there are no priorities given), which we denoted by ∼̂. Then any problem reduces
to an allocation problem with no priorities. Furthermore, it is easy to see that stability under ∼̂
is equivalent to non-wastefulness and individual rationality (and the properties in Theorem 2 are
independent because the properties in Theorem 1 are independent).
When applying responsive DA-mechanisms to problems with weak priorities, ties have to be
broken (in the special case of no priorities, all ties have to be broken). Essentially, whenever ties
are present in school choice, we face trade-offs between efficiency, stability, and strategy proofness.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2009) show that simulations with field data from the New York
City high school match and the theory favor single tie-breaking rules, i.e., indifferences are broken
the same way at every school. Formally, a MTB  of ̂ is a single tie-breaking (STB) if for all
x, y ∈ O and all i, j ∈ N , if i∼̂xj and i∼̂yj, then either [i x j and i y j] or [j x i and j y i].
Now, it is interesting to ask what exactly characterizes the subclass of responsive STB-DA-
mechanisms. Clearly, two-agent consistent conflict resolution in Theorem 2 adds an element of
decisiveness that, together with all other properties, helps to pins down the priority structure
for the underlying DA-mechanism. In order to characterize responsive STB-DA-mechanisms, the
priority ordering will have to be the same for all objects and therefore we will strengthen the
two-agent consistent conflict resolution property by extending the decisiveness requirement to two
(possibly distinct) objects.
Strong two-agent consistent conflict resolution applies to two problems when two agents compete
for two (possibly distinct) objects in maximal conflict situations, i.e., in each problem they have
the same preference relation such that in one problem they find only x ∈ O acceptable and in
another problem they find only y ∈ O acceptable: it then requires that if in these problems one
agent receives the acceptable object and the other receives the null object, the conflict is resolved
consistently in that it has to be the same agent in both problems who “wins the conflict” and
receives the acceptable object.
Strong Two-Agent Consistent Conflict Resolution: For all R,R′ ∈ RN , all q, q′ ∈ Q, all
Rx ∈ Rx, and all Ry ∈ Ry, if Ri = Rj = Rx, i∼̂xj and {ϕi(R, q), ϕj(R, q)} = {x, ∅}, and R′i = R′j =
Ry, i∼̂yj and {ϕi(R′, q′), ϕj(R′, q′)} = {y, ∅}, then for k ∈ {i, j}, ϕk(R, q) = ∅ ⇔ ϕk(R′, q′) = ∅.
Now a straightforward consequence of Theorem 2 is the following normative foundation for
responsive STB-DA-mechanisms.
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Theorem 3. Let ̂ be a (weak) priority structure. Responsive STB-DA-mechanisms are the only
mechanisms satisfying stability under ̂, unavailable type invariance, strong two-agent consistent
conflict resolution, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness.
7 Conclusion
Our model is that of assigning types (school seats) to a set of agents (students). Agents have strict
preferences over types and whenever we consider agents’ strict priorities for a certain type, we
capture them by an ordering of all agents. Of course, since sets of agents are assigned to an type, in
general priorities may depend on the whole set of agents and not only on the ordering of individual
agents. However, if priorities over sets of agents are responsive with respect to the strict priority
ordering over individual agents, then in determining stable allocations we only need to know the
priority orderings over individual agents. It is exactly this responsiveness-to-individual-priorities
feature that makes the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism easily applicable in practice
(Roth, 2008).
Kojima and Manea (2010) provide two characterizations of deferred acceptance mechanisms
with so-called acceptant substitutable priorities (a larger class of mechanisms than the class of
responsive DA-mechanisms which is based on priorities that are determined by a choice function
that reflects substitutability in priorities over sets of agents; see also Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005).
For this class of DA-mechanisms, priority orderings over individual agents do not suffice—the
priorities over sets of agents must be known. Furthermore, their characterizations use two new
monotonicity properties which are violated by priority mechanisms and linear programming mech-
anisms. Indeed, it can be seen that those classes of mechanisms violate all their properties in their
first characterization and two of the three properties in their second characterization. While the
class of DA-mechanisms with acceptant substitutable priorities is sometimes employed in real-life
markets, many applications involving DA-mechanisms are based on responsive priorities or slight
generalizations thereof. Thus, providing a rationale for this class of mechanisms is important. We
characterized responsive DA-mechanisms using very simple and intuitive properties plus strategy-
proofness.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Let  be a strict priority structure.
In showing (i), let g be a priority function and consider the priority mechanism M (g,) based
on g and . By definition, M (g,) satisfies unavailable type invariance and individual rationality.
For weak non-wastefulness, suppose that for (R, q), x ∈ O+(q) and i ∈ N we have
x Pi M
(g,)
i (R, q) and M
(g,)
i (R, q) = ∅. If |{j ∈ N : M (g,)j (R, q) = x}| < qx, then (i, x) is
an individually rational (a, b)-match and the priority mechanism M (g,) could not have stopped
without matching i and x.
For two-agent consistent conflict resolution, let (R, q) and (R, q′) be such that Ri = Rj = Rx
and {M (g,)i (R, q),M (g,)j (R, q)} = {M (g,)i (R, q′),M (g,)j (R, q′)} = {x, ∅}. Since rank(x,Ri) =
1 = rank(x,Rj), (i, x) is an (1, b)-match and (j, x) is an (1, b
′)-match where b = rank(i,x) and
b′ = rank(j,x). Because x is strict, b 6= b′ and we obtain from {M (g,)i (R, q),M (g,)j (R, q)} =




′), the desired conclusion.
For truncation invariance, let (R, q), i ∈ N , and R¯i be such that M (g,)i (R, q) ∈ A(R¯i) and
R¯i is a truncation of Ri. Note that this implies M
(g,)
i (R, q) 6= ∅. Hence, under (R, q) and
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(R¯i, R−i, q) the priority mechanism M (g,) matches identically all agent-type pairs and we obtain
M (g,)(R, q) = M (g,)(R¯i, R−i, q).
In showing (ii), note that all properties can be easily formulated for random mechanisms (for
instance by putting positive probability only on individually rational allocations). Let h be a
weighting function and consider the linear programming mechanism M (h,) based on h and . By
definition, M (h,) satisfies unavailable type invariance and individual rationality.
For weak non-wastefulness, suppose that for (R, q), x ∈ O+(q) and i ∈ N we have
x Pi M
(h,)
i (R, q) and M
(h,)
i (R, q) = ∅. If |{j ∈ N : M (h,)j (R, q) = x}| < qx, then (i, x) is some
individually rational (a, b)-match with h(a, b) > 0. Now M (h,)(q,R) could not have maximized
the score among all individually rational allocations.
For two-agent consistent conflict resolution, let (R, q) and (R, q′) be such that Ri = Rj = Rx
and {M (h,)i (R, q),M (h,)j (R, q)} = {M (h,)i (R, q′),M (h,)j (R, q′)} = {x, ∅}. Since rank(x,Ri) =
1 = rank(x,Rj), (i, x) is an (1, b)-match and (j, x) is an (1, b
′)-match where b = rank(i,x)
and b′ = rank(j,x). Because x is strict, b 6= b′ and h(1, b) 6= h(1, b′). Thus, we obtain




′) and M (h,)j (R, q) = M
(h,)
j (R, q
′), the desired conclusion.
For truncation invariance, let (R, q), i ∈ N , and R¯i be such that M (h,)i (R, q) ∈ A(R¯i) and R¯i
is a truncation of Ri. Note that this implies M
(h,)
i (R, q) 6= ∅. Hence, under (R, q) and (R¯i, R−i, q)
the allocation M (h,)(R, q) maximizes the score among all individually rational allocations and
we obtain M (h,)(R, q) = M (h,)(R¯i, R−i, q) (we refer to Ehlers (2008) for random mechanisms
satisfying truncation invariance).
In showing (iii), consider the responsive DA-mechanism based on . It is easy to see that
DA satisfies unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, two-agent
consistent conflict resolution, and truncation invariance.
B Proof of Theorem 1
It is easy to verify that responsive DA-mechanisms satisfy the properties of Theorem 1. Conversely,
let ϕ be a mechanism satisfying the properties of Theorem 1. First, we “calibrate/construct the
priority structure using maximal conflict preference profiles.”
Let x ∈ O and let Rx ∈ Rx (i.e., A(Rx) = {x}). Let R∅ ∈ R be such that A(R∅) = ∅.
For any S ⊆ N , let RxS = (Rxi )i∈S such that for all i ∈ S, Rxi = Rx, and similarly R∅S = (R∅i )i∈S
such that for all i ∈ S, R∅i = R∅.
Let 1x denote the capacity vector q such that qx = 1 and for all z ∈ O\{x}, qz = 0. Similarly, for
y ∈ O \ {x} let 1xy denote the capacity vector q such that qx = 1, qy = 1, and for all z ∈ O \ {x, y},
qz = 0.
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Consider the problem (RxN , 1x). By weak non-wastefulness, for some j ∈ N , ϕj(RxN , 1x) = x,
say j = 1. Then, for all i ∈ N \ {1}, we set 1 x i.
Next consider the problem ((R∅1, R
x−1), 1x). By weak non-wastefulness and individual rationality,
for some j ∈ N \ {1}, ϕj((R∅1, Rx−1), 1x) = x, say j = 2. Then, for all i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, we set 2 x i.
By induction, we obtain x for any type x and thus a priority structure = (x)x∈O.
Lemma 1. For all R ∈ RN and all x ∈ O, if for some j ∈ N , ϕj(R, 1x) = x, then for all
i ∈ N \ {j}, x ∈ A(Ri) implies j x i.
Proof. Let R ∈ RN and x ∈ O. Without loss of generality, suppose 1 x 2 x · · · x n. Let
S = {i ∈ N : x ∈ A(Ri)} and let j = minS. We prove Lemma 1 by showing that ϕj(R, 1x) = x. In
the sequel, when using two-agent consistent conflict resolution we often also implicitly apply weak
non-wastefulness and individual rationality.
Note that for all i ∈ N\S, ∅Pix. We partition the set N\S into the “lower” set L = {1, . . . , j−1}
(possibly L = ∅) and the “upper” set U = N \ (L ∪ S) (possibly U = ∅). Note that by unavailable







By the construction of x, ϕj((R∅L, RxS∪U ), 1x) = x. Hence, if U = ∅, then ϕj(R, 1x) = x and
for all i ∈ N , x ∈ A(Ri) implies j x i.
Step 1 : Let k ∈ U . We prove that ϕj((R∅L, RxS∪(U\{k}), R∅k), 1x) = ϕj((R∅L, RxS∪U ), 1x) = x.
Let y ∈ O \ {x}. By two-agent consistent conflict resolution, ϕj((R∅L, RxS∪U ), 1xy) = x. Let
R′k ∈ R be such that R′k : y x ∅ . . .. By strategy-proofness, ϕk((R∅L, RxS∪(U\{k}), R′k), 1xy) 6=





















k), 1xy) = y.







k), 1xy) = y. By weak non-wastefulness and individual rationality, for some
l ∈ S ∪ (U \ {k}), ϕl((R∅L, RxS∪(U\{k}), R′′k), 1xy) = x.
Now R′′k is a truncation of R
′
k and both y ∈ A(R′′k) and ϕk((R∅L, RxS∪(U\{k}), R′k), 1xy) =
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k), 1x) 6= x. If S ∪ (U \ {k}) = {j}, then by
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U ), 1x) = ϕj(R, 1x). Hence, we obtain the
desired result that ϕj(R, 1x) = x.
For any number qx ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qx}, let qx ◦ 1x = (qx, 0O\{x}) denote the capacity vector with
exactly qx copies of object x. The following lemma is the extension of Lemma 1 to the general
capacity case.
Lemma 2. For all R ∈ RN and all qx ∈ {1, . . . , qx}, if T = {j ∈ N : ϕj(R, qx ◦ 1x) = x}, then for
all j ∈ T and all i ∈ N \ T , x ∈ A(Ri) implies j x i.
Proof. Let R ∈ RN , qx ∈ {1, . . . , qx}, T = {j ∈ N : ϕj(R, qx ◦ 1x) = x}, and S = {i ∈ N :
x ∈ A(Ri)}. By individual rationality, T ⊆ S. Let j ∈ T and i ∈ S \ T . We prove Lemma 2 by
showing that j x i. In the sequel, when using two-agent consistent conflict resolution we often
also implicitly apply weak non-wastefulness and individual rationality.
If qx = 1, then by Lemma 1, j x i.
Next, suppose that qx = 2. Note that by unavailable type invariance, ϕ(R, qx ◦ 1x) =
ϕ((RxS , R
∅
−S), qx ◦ 1x). Let k ∈ S be such that ϕk((RxS , R∅−S), 1x) = x. By Lemma 1, k x i.




−S), qx ◦ 1x) = x. Hence, k ∈ T and k x i.





−S), qx ◦ 1x) = x. Let y ∈ O \ {x} and R′k ∈ R be such that R′k : y x ∅ . . ..











k), qx ◦ 1x) = x.




















k), 1xy) = x. By two-






k), 1x) = x. Hence, by Lemma 1, h x i.
Now by induction on qx the conclusion of Lemma 2 follows.
Lemma 3. For all (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q, ϕ(R, q) is stable under .
Proof. Let (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q and assume that ϕ(R, q) is not stable under . Then, there exists an
agent-object pair (i, x) ∈ N ×O∪{∅} such that xPiϕi(R, q) and (s1) |{j ∈ N : ϕj(R, q) = x}| < qx
or (s2) there exists k ∈ N such that ϕk(R, q) = x and i x k. By individual rationality, x 6= ∅.
Let R¯ ∈ RN be such that (a) for all j ∈ N such that ϕj(R, q) 6= ∅, R¯j is a truncation of Rj
such that there exists no y ∈ O \ {ϕj(R, q)} with ϕj(R, q) R¯j y R¯j ∅ and (b) for all j ∈ N such
that ϕj(R, q) = ∅, R¯j = Rj . (By individual rationality, R¯j in (a) is well-defined as truncation of
Rj .) By truncation invariance, ϕ(R¯, q) = ϕ(R, q) and (i, x) ∈ N ×O is such that x P¯i ϕi(R¯, q) and
(s1’) |{j ∈ N : ϕj(R¯, q) = x}| < qx or (s2’) there exists k ∈ N such that ϕk(R¯, q) = x and i x k.
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Let S = {j ∈ N : x P¯j ϕj(R¯, q)}. Note that i ∈ S. Let T = {j ∈ N : ϕj(R¯, q) = x}. By
unavailable type invariance, ϕ(R¯, qx ◦ 1x) = ϕ((R¯xS∪T , R¯∅N\(S∪T )), qx ◦ 1x).
Step 1 : Assume that for j ∈ S, ϕj(R¯, qx ◦ 1x) = x. Then, by strategy-proofness and in-
dividual rationality, ϕj((R¯−j , Rxj ), qx ◦ 1x) = x and ϕj((R¯−j , Rxj ), q) = ∅. By weak non-
wastefulness, |{k ∈ N : ϕk((R¯−j , Rxj ), q) = x}| = qx. By individual rationality there
exists l ∈ N such that x ∈ A(R¯l), and ϕl((R¯−j , Rxj ), q) = x and ϕl((R¯−j , Rxj ), qx ◦
1x) = ∅. By Lemma 2, j x l. Next, by strategy-proofness, ϕl((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), q) =
x. By unavailable type invariance, ϕ((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , R
x
l ), qx ◦ 1x) = ϕ((R¯−j , Rxj ), qx ◦ 1x);
in particular, ϕj((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , R
x
l ), qx ◦ 1x) = x and ϕl((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), qx ◦ 1x) = ∅.
Thus, ϕj((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , R
x
l ), q) = ∅ would contradict two-agent consistent conflict resolu-
tion because then {ϕj((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), q), ϕl((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), q)} = {ϕj((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), qx ◦
1x), ϕl((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , R
x
l ), qx ◦ 1x)} = {x, ∅}. Hence, ϕj((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), q) = x. Thus, there ex-
ists an agent j2 ∈ N \ {j, l} such that ϕj2((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), q) = ∅ and ϕj2((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), qx ◦
1x) = x. However, R¯j2 = R
x
j2
would contradict two-agent consistent conflict resolu-
tion because then {ϕj2((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), q), ϕl((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), q)} = {ϕj2((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , Rxl ), qx ◦
1x), ϕl((R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , R
x
l ), qx ◦ 1x)} = {x, ∅}. Hence, R¯j2 6= Rxj2 .
Steps 2, . . . : Step 2 replicates Step 1 with the starting preference profile (R¯−{j,l}, Rxj , R
x
l ) and with
agent j2 in the role of agent j. Throughout the step, we strictly increase the number of agents with
preferences Rx (at least by agent j2). Furthermore, the step ends with the existence of another
agent j3 with R¯j3 6= Rxj3 with whom we proceed to Step 3. Since the number of agents is finite, we
obtain a contradiction in finitely many steps.
Final Step: With the previous steps we have established that for all j ∈ S, ϕj(R¯, qx ◦1x) = ∅. Note
that by construction of R¯, for all j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ), ∅ P¯j x. Hence, by individual rationality, for all
j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ), ϕj(R¯, qx ◦ 1x) = ∅. Note that by individual rationality, for all j ∈ T , x ∈ A(R¯j).
Hence, by weak non-wastefulness, for all j ∈ T , ϕj(R¯, qx ◦ 1x) = x and |T | = qx. By Lemma 2, we
have that (∗) for all j ∈ T and all l ∈ S, j x l.
Recall that T = {j ∈ N : ϕj(R¯, q) = x}. Hence, (s1’) cannot be the case. Thus, by (s2’) there
exists k ∈ N such that ϕk(R¯, q) = x and i x k. Recall that i ∈ S and that ϕk(R¯, q) = x implies
that k ∈ T so that i x k contradicts (∗).
So far we have established that for any mechanism ϕ that satisfies the properties of Theorem 1,
there exists a priority ordering  such that for any (R, q) ∈ RN × Q, ϕ(R, q) is stable under .
Hence, in the terminology of two-sided matching, the mechanism ϕ picks a stable allocation for
the many-to-one two-sided market where types have responsive preferences over sets of agents who
consume the objects based on the priority structure and agents have strict preferences over objects
based on preferences R (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Chapter 5). For these markets it is well-
known that the responsive DA-mechanism is the only strategy-proof stable matching mechanism.
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For completeness, we provide a proof which uses some standard results from many-to-one two-sided
markets with responsive preferences.
Lemma 4. For all (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q, ϕ(R, q) = DA(R, q).
Proof. Let (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q and assume that ϕ(R, q) 6= DA(R, q). By Lemma 3, ϕ(R, q) is stable
under . Thus, since DA(R, q) is the agent-optimal stable matching (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990,
Corollary 5.9), for all i ∈ N , DAi (R, q)Riϕi(R, q). Since ϕ(R, q) 6= DA(R, q), there exists j ∈ N
such that DAj (R, q) Pj ϕj(R, q). By individual rationality, ϕj(R, q)Rj ∅. Thus, DAj (R, q) 6= ∅.
Let R¯j be such that R¯j |O = Rj |O and there is no x ∈ O \ {DAj (R, q)} such that DAj (R, q) R¯j
xR¯j ∅. Since R¯j is a truncation of Rj and DA satisfies truncation invariance, DA((R¯j , R−j), q) =
DA(R, q). Thus, DAj ((R¯j , R−j), q) 6= ∅.
By Lemma 3, ϕj((R¯j , R−j), q) is stable under . By Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Corollary 5.9),
DAj ((R¯j , R−j), q)Rjϕj((R¯j , R−j), q). By DA

j ((R¯j , R−j), q) 6= ∅ and the fact that the set of agents
receiving the null object is identical for any two stable matchings (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990,
Theorem 5.12), we have ϕj((R¯j , R−j), q) 6= ∅. Now, by the definition of R¯j , ϕj((R¯j , R−j), q) =
DAj ((R¯j , R−j), q). Hence, ϕj((R¯j , R−j), q) = DA

j ((R¯j , R−j), q) = DA

j (R, q) Pj ϕj(R, q), which
contradicts strategy-proofness.
C Variable Agents and Weak Consistency
Let N again denote the finite set of agents, but the set of agents who are present in a problem can
vary. We define the set of all nonempty subsets of N by N ≡ {M : M ⊆ N and M 6= ∅}. An
(allocation) problem (with capacity constraints) now consists of a set N ′ ∈ N of agents, a preference
profile R ∈ RN ′ , and a capacity vector q. We denote the set of all problems by ⋃N ′∈N RN ′×Q. We
adjust our previous model, definitions, and properties by simply replacing the domain of problems
RN ×Q by the variable population domain ⋃N ′∈N RN ′ ×Q. Given N ′ ∈ N and R ∈ RN ′ , for any
M ′ ∈ N such that M ′ ⊆ N ′, let RM ′ denote the profile (Ri)i∈M ′ .
A requirement for a mechanism that is very much in the spirit of unavailable type invariance
is unassigned type invariance: the chosen allocation does not depend on the unconsumed or unas-
signed objects. Given a problem (R, q) ∈ ⋃N ′∈N RN ′ × Q, we define by q(ϕ(R, q)) the capacity
vector of assigned objects: for all x ∈ O, qx(ϕ(R, q)) = |{j ∈ N ′ : ϕj(R, q) = x}|.
Unassigned Type Invariance: For all (R, q) ∈ ⋃N ′∈N RN ′ ×Q, ϕ(R, q) = ϕ(R, q(ϕ(R, q))).
Consistency is one of the key properties in many frameworks with variable population scenarios.
Thomson (2009) provides an extensive survey of consistency in various applications. Consistency
requires that if some agents leave a problem with their allotments, then the mechanism should
allocate the remaining objects among the agents who did not leave in the same way as in the
original problem.
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Consistency: For all M ′, N ′ ∈ N such that M ′ ⊆ N ′, all R ∈ RN ′ , all q ∈ Q, and all i ∈ M ′,
ϕi(R, q) = ϕi(RM ′ , q˜) where q˜x = qx − |{j ∈ N ′ \M ′ : ϕj(R, q) = x}| for all x ∈ O.
It follows from Ergin (2002, Theorem 1)—for a fixed capacity vector q—that the only responsive
DA-mechanisms satisfying consistency are the ones with an “acyclic” priority structure.12
The following property is a weak consistency property that all responsive DA-mechanisms sat-
isfy. It requires that if some agents leave a problem with their allotments, then an agent who did
not leave and who received the null object, still receives the null object. In other words, allocations
only need to be consistent with respect to the agents who receive the null object.
Weak Consistency: For all M ′, N ′ ∈ N such that M ′ ⊆ N ′, all R ∈ RN ′ , all q ∈ Q, and all
i ∈ M ′, if ϕi(R, q) = ∅, then ϕi(RM ′ , q˜) = ∅ where q˜x = qx − |{j ∈ N ′ \M ′ : ϕj(R, q) = x}| for all
x ∈ O.
Theorem 4. Responsive DA-mechanisms are the only mechanisms satisfying unassigned type in-
variance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and strategy-proofness.
Below we adjust the definition of priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms to
the variable population framework such that they satisfy all properties in Theorem 4 except for
strategy-proofness (like Proposition 1 for Theorem 1).
For a strict priority structure  and a priority function g, the priority mechanism based on
(g,) matches for any problem (R, q) ∈ ⋃N ′∈N RN ′ ×Q all agent-type pairs that have the highest
priority according to g subject to individual rationality and the quotas. Note that the ranking of
unavailable objects is maintained in the agents’ preferences and the ranking of agents belonging to
N\N ′ is maintained in .
Similarly, for a strict priority structure  and a weighting function h, the linear programming
mechanism based on (h,) chooses for any problem (R, q) ∈ ⋃N ′∈N RN ′ × Q an individually
rational allocation with maximal score among all individually rational allocations. Note that here
again the ranking of unavailable objects is maintained in the agents’ preferences and the ranking
of agents belonging to N\N ′ is maintained in .
Analogously to Theorem 2 we obtain a foundation of responsive MTB-DA-mechanisms using
the previous characterization (Theorem 4).
Theorem 5. Let ̂ be a (weak) priority structure. Responsive MTB-DA-mechanisms are the
only mechanisms satisfying stability under ̂, unassigned type invariance, weak consistency, and
strategy-proofness.
12Ehlers and Erdil (2010) generalize this result from strict priorities to weak priorities.
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Proof of Theorem 4
It is easy to verify that responsive DA-mechanisms satisfy the properties of Theorem 4. Conversely,
let ϕ be a mechanism satisfying these properties. First, we “calibrate/construct the priority struc-
ture using maximal conflict preference profiles.”
Let x ∈ O and let Rx ∈ Rx (i.e., A(Rx) = {x}). Let R∅ ∈ R be such that A(R∅) = ∅.
For any S ⊆ N , let RxS = (Rxi )i∈S such that for all i ∈ S, Rxi = Rx, and similarly R∅S = (R∅i )i∈S
such that for all i ∈ S, R∅i = R∅.
Let 1x denote the capacity vector q such that qx = 1 and for all z ∈ O \ {x}, qz = 0.
Consider the problem (RxN , 1x). By weak non-wastefulness, for some j ∈ N , ϕj(RxN , 1x) = x,
say j = 1. Then, for all i ∈ N \ {1}, we set 1 x i.
Next consider the problem (RxN\{1}, 1x). By weak non-wastefulness and individual rationality,
for some j ∈ N \ {1}, ϕj(RxN\{1}, 1x) = x, say j = 2. Then, for all i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, we set 2 x i.
By induction, we obtain x for any type x and thus a priority structure = (x)x∈O.
Lemma 5. For all N ′ ∈ N , all R′ ∈ RN ′, and all x ∈ O, if for some j ∈ N , ϕj(R′, 1x) = x, then
for all i ∈ N ′ \ {j}, x ∈ A(R′i) implies j x i.
Proof. Let N ′ ∈ N , R′ ∈ RN ′ , and x ∈ O. Without loss of generality, suppose 1 x 2 x · · · x n.
Let S = {i ∈ N ′ : x ∈ A(R′i)} and let j = minS. We prove Lemma 5 by showing that ϕj(R′, 1x) =
x.
By weak non-wastefulness and individual rationality, for some l ∈ S, ϕl(R′, 1x) = x. Assume, for
a contradiction, that l 6= j. Thus, ϕj(R′, 1x) = ∅. Hence, by weak consistency, ϕj(R′{j,l}, 1x) = ∅.
By weak non-wastefulness, ϕl(R
′









l ), 1x) = ∅. By weak non-wastefulness, ϕl((Rxj , Rxl ), 1x) = x.
Let L = {1, . . . , j − 1} (possibly L = ∅). By the construction of x, ϕj(RxN\L, 1x) = x. Thus,
ϕl(R
x
N\L, 1x) = ∅. Hence, by weak consistency, ϕl(Rx{j,l}, 1x) = ∅. By weak non-wastefulness,
ϕj(R
x






l ) and l 6= j, we have established a contradiction. Thus,
l = j and ϕj(R
′, 1x) = x.
Let Rˆ = {Ri ∈ R : |A(Ri)| ≤ 1}.
Lemma 6.
(a) For all N ′ ∈ N and all (R, q) ∈ RN ′ ×Q, if |N ′| = 2, then ϕ(R, q) is stable under .
(b) For all N ′ ∈ N and all (R, q) ∈ RˆN ′ ×Q, ϕ(R, q) is stable under .
Proof. In order to show (a), suppose that ϕ(R, q) is not stable under . Then, there exists an
agent-object pair (i, x) ∈ N ′×O∪{∅} such that xPiϕi(R, q) and (s1) |{j ∈ N ′ : ϕj(R, q) = x}| < qx
or (s2) there exists k ∈ N ′ such that ϕk(R, q) = x and i x k. By individual rationality, x 6= ∅.
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Without loss of generality, let i be the agent ranked highest according to x to form such an
agent-object blocking pair.
Let N ′ = {i, k} and Rxi ∈ Rx as in the calibration/construction step used to define x.
By strategy-proofness, ϕi((R
x
i , Rk), q) = ∅. By weak non-wastefulness and individual rationality,
ϕk((R
x
i , Rk), q) = x, x Pk ∅, and qx = 1. Let Rxk = Rxi . By strategy-proofness, ϕk((Rxi , Rxk), q) = x.




k), q) = ∅. Then, by Lemma 5 it follows that k x i. Hence,
for ϕ(R, q) we must have (s1) |{j ∈ N ′ : ϕj(R, q) = x}| < qx.
Recall that we obtained qx = 1 and k x i. Hence, (s1) implies that object x is not assigned at
ϕ(R, q). Because i is the agent ranked highest according tox to form an agent-object blocking pair,





k, q) = ∅. By individual rationality, ϕi(Rxi , Ryk, q) 6= y. But this is a contradiction to weak
non-wastefulness for k and y.
In order to show (b), suppose that ϕ(R, q) is not stable under . Then, there exists an agent-
object pair (i, x) ∈ N ′ × O ∪ {∅} such that x Pi ϕi(R, q) and (s1) |{j ∈ N ′ : ϕj(R, q) = x}| < qx
or (s2) there exists k ∈ N ′ such that ϕk(R, q) = x and i x k. By individual rationality, x 6= ∅.
Without loss of generality, let i be the agent ranked highest according to x to form such an
agent-object blocking pair.
Since Ri ∈ Rˆ, we have A(Ri) = {x} and ϕi(R, q) = ∅. By weak non-wastefulness, (s1) cannot
occur, i.e., we have (s2) there exists k ∈ N ′ such that ϕk(R, q) = x and i x k.
By weak consistency, ϕi(R{i,k}, q˜) = ∅ (where q˜z = qz − |{j ∈ N ′ \ {i, k} : ϕj(R, q) = z}| for
all z ∈ O). By weak non-wastefulness, ϕk(R{i,k}, q˜) = x. Hence, ϕ(R{i,k}, q˜) is not stable under ,
which contradicts (a).
Lemma 7. For all N ′ ∈ N and all (R, q) ∈ RN ′ ×Q, ϕ(R, q) is stable under .
Proof. For any profile R ∈ RN ′ , let Nˆ(R) = {i ∈ N ′ : Ri /∈ Rˆ}. We prove that ϕ(R, q) is stable
under  by induction on |Nˆ(R)|.
Induction Basis: For |Nˆ(R)| = 0, Lemma 6 (b) implies that ϕ(R, q) is stable under .
Induction Hypothesis: Assume that ϕ(R, q) is stable under for any R ∈ RN ′ such that |Nˆ(R)| ≤ k.
Induction Step: Let R ∈ RN ′ be such that |Nˆ(R)| = k + 1. Suppose that ϕ(R, q) is not stable
under . Then, there exists an agent-object pair (i, x) ∈ N ′ ×O ∪ {∅} such that x Pi ϕi(R, q) and
(s1) |{j ∈ N ′ : ϕj(R, q) = x}| < qx or (s2) there exists l ∈ N ′ such that ϕl(R, q) = x and i x l. By
individual rationality, x 6= ∅. Without loss of generality, let i be the agent ranked highest according
to x to form such an agent-object blocking pair.
If ϕi(R, q) = ∅, then by weak non-wastefulness, we have (s2) there exists l ∈ N ′ such that
ϕl(R, q) = x and i x l. By weak consistency, ϕi(R{i,l}, q˜) = ∅ (where q˜z = qz − |{j ∈ N ′ \ {i, l} :
25
ϕj(R, q) = z}| for all z ∈ O). By weak non-wastefulness, ϕl(R{i,l}, q˜) = x. Hence, ϕ(R{i,l}, q˜) is
not stable under , which contradicts Lemma 6 (a).
Thus, ϕi(R, q) 6= ∅ and Ri /∈ Rˆ. Let Rxi ∈ Rx. By strategy-proofness, ϕi((Rxi , R−i), q) = ∅.
Note that |Nˆ(Rxi , R−i)| = k and by the induction hypothesis, ϕ((Rxi , R−i), q) is stable under .
For (s2) there exists l ∈ N ′ such that ϕl(R, q) = x and i x l. Hence, by ϕi((Rxi , R−i), q) = ∅
and stability, ϕl((R
x
i , R−i), q) 6= x. For (s1) |{j ∈ N ′ : ϕj(R, q) = x}| < qx, ϕi((Rxi , R−i), q) = ∅
and weak non-wastefulness imply |{j ∈ N ′ : ϕj((Rxi , R−i), q) = x}| = qx. Hence, in both cases (s1)
and (s2) there exists j ∈ N ′ \ {i} such that ϕj((Rxi , R−i), q) = x 6= ϕj(R, q).
Thus, stability, ϕj((R
x
i , R−i), q) = x, and ϕi((R
x
i , R−i), q) = ∅ imply j x i. Because i is the
agent ranked highest according to x to form an agent-object blocking pair, ϕj(R, q) Pj x and
Rj /∈ Rˆ.
Step 1 : Let ϕj(R, q) = y ∈ O and Ryj ∈ Ry. By strategy-proofness, ϕj((Ryj , R−j), q) =
y. Recall that ϕj((R
x





j , R−i,j), q) = ∅.
Note that both |Nˆ(Ryj , R−j)| ≤ k and |Nˆ(Rxi , Ryj , R−i,j)| ≤ k and the induction hypoth-





j , R−i,j), q) = y 6= ϕh((Ryj , R−j), q). By stability and ϕj((Rxi , Ryj , R−i,j), q) = ∅, we
have h y j. If y Ph ϕh((Ryj , R−j), q), then by h y j and ϕj((Ryj , R−j), q) = y, ϕ((Ryj , R−j), q) is
not stable under , a contradiction.
Thus, ϕh((R
y
j , R−j), q) Ph y and Rh /∈ Rˆ.
Step 2 : Let ϕh((R
y
j , R−j), q) = z ∈ O. As in Step 1, we use strategy-proofness to replace Rh by
Rzh in the problems ((R
y




j , R−i,j), q). Then again we find a new agent h
′ with
Rh′ /∈ Rˆ, etc.
Because the set of agents is finite, continuing along the lines of Steps 1 and 2 will ultimately
lead to a contradiction.
The proof that for all N ′ ∈ N and (R, q) ∈ ⋃N ′∈N RN ′ ×Q, ϕ(R, q) = DA(R, q) is similar to
the proof of Lemma 4 (which only uses strategy-proofness).
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Supplementary Appendix (not intended for publication)
D Discussion of Kojima and Manea (2010)
We presented two characterizations of the class of DA-mechanisms with responsive priorities, i.e.,
any of these mechanisms determines the outcome by solely using the priority orderings over in-
dividual agents (see Remark 1). In contrast, Kojima and Manea (2010) characterize the class
of DA-mechanisms with so-called acceptant substitutable priorities: a larger class of mechanisms
than the class of responsive DA-mechanisms that is based on priorities that are determined by a
choice function that reflects substitutability in preferences over sets of agents (see also Hatfield and
Milgrom, 2005).
Formally, Kojima and Manea (2010) define a priority for a type x ∈ O with capacity qx as a
(choice) correspondence Cqx : 2
N → 2N satisfying for all M ⊆ N , Cqx(M) ⊆ M and |Cqx(M)| ≤
qx. Cqx is substitutable if for all M
′ ⊆ M ⊆ N , Cqx(M) ∩M ′ ⊆ Cqx(M ′). Cqx is acceptant if
for all M ⊆ N , |Cqx(M)| = min{qx, |M |}. Clearly, taking a linear order x over agents and
defining Cqx by choosing the min{qx, |M |} best agents in M according to x defines an acceptant
substitutable priority. This particular class of priorities coincides with the class of (acceptant)
responsive priorities employed in this paper (see Remark 1). Note that if qx = 1, then the class of
acceptant substitutable priorities coincides with our class of (acceptant) responsive priorities.
Since in our model resources can change, acceptant substitutable priorities for a type x ∈ O in
our model are modeled by a profile Cx = (Cqx)1≤qx≤q¯x . We refer to Kojima and Manea (2010) for
the definition of the DA-mechanism based on a acceptant substitutable priority structure—with
our extended notion of acceptant substitutable priorities it is straightforward how this definition
extends to our setup which allows for changing capacities and agents.13
Non-wastefulness as used by Kojima and Manea (2010)14 implies weak non-wastefulness,
and individual rationality. Note that Kojima and Manea’s (2010) non-wastefulness condition
is equivalent to individual rationality and non-wastefulness. Furthermore, non-wastefulness is
equivalent to the absence of agent-object pairs (i, x) ∈ N ∪ {∅} such that x Pi ϕi(R, q) and
(s1) |{j ∈ N : ϕj(R, q) = x}| < qx. Thus, non-wastefulness already incorporates an important part
of stability. Note that non-wastefulness already eliminates priority mechanisms and linear program-
ming mechanisms (these mechanisms do satisfy weak non-wastefulness, but not non-wastefulness).
In the characterizations obtained by Kojima and Manea (2010), next to non-wastefulness, two
monotonicity properties are employed: individually rational (IR) monotonicity and weak Maskin
13Notice that any acceptant priority structure satisfies the law of demand : for all x ∈ O and all M ′ ⊆ N ′ ⊆
N , |Cx(M ′)| ≤ |Cx(N ′)|. Hence, by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005, Theorem 11), all acceptant substitutable DA-
mechanisms satisfy strategy-proofness.
14Kojima and Manea (2010) Non-Wastefulness: For all (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q, all x ∈ O+(q)∪{∅} with |{j ∈ N :
ϕj(R, q) = x}| < qx, and all i ∈ N , ϕi(R, q) Ri x.
27
monotonicity. We first define both monotonicity properties (using the equivalent “unilateral” def-
initions).15
Given i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R, a strategy R¯i ∈ R is an individually rational (IR) monotonic
transformation of Ri at ϕi(R, q) if for all x ∈ O, x P¯i ϕi(R, q) and x P¯i ∅ imply x Pi ϕi(R, q).
Individually Rational (IR) Monotonicity: For all (R, q) ∈ RN×Q, all i ∈ N , and all R¯i ∈ Ri,
if R¯i is an IR monotonic transformation of Ri at ϕi(R, q) and R¯ = (R¯i, R−i), then for all j ∈ N ,
ϕj(R¯, q) R¯j ϕj(R, q).
Given i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R, a strategy R¯i ∈ R is a monotonic transformation of Ri at ϕi(R, q) if
for all x ∈ O ∪ {∅}, x P¯i ϕi(R, q) implies x Pi ϕi(R, q).
Weak Maskin Monotonicity: For all (R, q) ∈ RN × Q, all i ∈ N , and all R¯i ∈ Ri, if R¯i
is a Maskin monotonic transformation of Ri at ϕi(R, q) and R¯ = (R¯i, R−i), then for all j ∈ N ,
ϕj(R¯, q) R¯j ϕj(R, q).
By Kojima and Manea (2010, Theorem 1) all DA-mechanisms with acceptant substitutable
priorities satisfy non-wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. It is easily seen that the
class of priority mechanisms satisfies neither non-wastefulness nor individually rational monotonic-
ity. The same is true for the class of linear programming mechanisms.
By Kojima and Manea (2010, Theorem 2) all DA-mechanisms with acceptant substitutable
priorities satisfy non-wastefulness, population monotonicity, and weak Maskin monotonicity. It is
easily seen that the class of priority mechanisms satisfies neither non-wastefulness nor weak Maskin
monotonicity. The same is true for the class of linear programming mechanisms.
Our characterizations of responsive DA-mechanisms are based on simple and intuitive properties
except for strategy-proofness (and again, this property makes the difference). In the characteri-
zations of Kojima and Manea (2010) relatively stronger axioms are used and in each of their
characterizations, both the classes of priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms
violate at least two properties. Our results further support the use of responsive DA-mechanism as
a practical solution in real-life matching markets where incentive compatibility is important.
Next, we present an example of an acceptant substitutable priority that is not responsive.
Example 1. Let N = {s1, s2, j1, j2} be four economists looking for a new academic position.
Furthermore, s1, s2 are seniors with specializations 1 or 2 and j1, j2 are juniors with specializations
1 or 2. The intuition behind the priorities that we define is the following. An economics department
z has the following preferences for hiring. If only one economist can be hired the priority ranking
for hiring is s1 z s2 z j1 z j2. However, if two positions can be filled, the department always
would like to fill both positions. So, q¯z = 2. Furthermore, they would like to hire the two seniors;
15It can be shown that either of the two monotonicity properties implies truncation invariance.
28
but if only one senior si can be hired, then they are interested in also hiring the junior ji in the
same field. To be more specific, we assume that the department’s priority ranking for hiring two
economists is {s1, s2} z {s1, j1} z {s2, j2} z {s1, j2} z {s2, j1} z {j1, j2}.
Note that the department loosely speaking has lexicographic preferences. Priorities Cqz based on
these preferences work as follows. For qz = 2 (the case qz = 1 is obvious) it follows that
Cqz(M) =

M if |M | ≤ 2,
{s1, s2} if {s1, s2}  M,
{si, ji} if {si, ji}  M, i ∈ {1, 2}.
It is easily verified that Cz = (Cqz)1≤qz≤2 is an acceptant and substitutable priority. Since
Cqz=2({s1, j1, j2}) = {s1, j1} and Cqz=2({s2, j1, j2}) = {s2, j2}, Cqz=2 is not responsive. 
E Independence
Note that below any mechanism satisfying weak non-wastefulness also satisfies non-wastefulness and
weak non-wastefulness may be replaced by non-wastefulness without altering the independence of
the axioms in any of our characterizations.
E.1 Independence of Properties in Theorem 1
The following example shows that on the domain of all problems, two-agent consistent conflict
resolution is independent from all other properties in Theorem 1.
Example 2. The following mechanism f , which is not a responsive DA-mechanism, satisfies un-
available type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, truncation invariance, and
strategy-proofness. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, O = {x, y}, and q¯x = 2 and q¯y = 1. Furthermore,
x: 1 2 3, ′x: 1 3 2, and y: 1 2 3. Let = (x,y) and ′= (′x,y). Then, for each
problem (R, q) ∈ RN ×Q,
f(R, q) =
{
DA′(R, q) if qx = 2 and x is agent 1’s favorite object in O+(q) and
DA(R, q) otherwise.
It is easy to see that f satisfies unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-
wastefulness, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness.
Not two-agent consistent conflict resolving: In Example 2, let R ∈ RN be such that yP1xP1∅
and R2 = R3 = R
x. Let q ∈ Q be such that qx = 2 and qy = 0. Then ϕ2(R, q) = ∅ and ϕ3(R, q) = x
whereas ϕ2(R, 1xy) = x and ϕ3(R, 1xy) = ∅.
In the following we consider the house allocation model, i.e., for all x ∈ O, qx = 1. Therefore,
instead of denoting capacity vectors, we simply denote the set of available real types, e.g., for
O′ ⊆ O, O′ 6= ∅, (R,O′) denotes a problem where one copy of each type in O′ is available.
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For any strict order pi of agents in N , we denote the corresponding serial dictatorship mechanism
by fpi; for example, if pi : 1 2 . . . (n − 1) n, then fpi works as follows: for each problem (R,O′),
first agent 1 chooses his preferred object in O′, then agent 2 chooses his preferred object from the
remaining objects O′ \ {fpi1 (R,O′)}, etc. Note that for each strict order pi of N , fpi = DA
pi
where
pi equals the priority order where for all x ∈ O, pix= pi. Thus, each serial dictatorship mechanism
fpi satisfies unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, two-agent
consistent conflict resolution, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness.
The following examples establish the independence of the properties (properties not mentioned
in the examples follow easily).
Not unavailable type invariant: Let n ≥ 3 and pi : 1 2 3 . . . (n−1) n and pi′ : 1 n (n−1) . . . 3 2.
Then, for each problem (R,O′),
ϕ(R,O′) =
{




Not individually rational: Let pi : 1 2 . . . (n − 1) n. For each Rn ∈ R, let Rˆn be such that
A(Rˆn) = O and Rˆn|O = Rn|O. Then, for each problem (R,O′),
ϕ(R,O′) = fpi((R−n, Rˆn), O′).
Not weakly non-wasteful: Fix an object y ∈ O and pi : 1 2 . . . (n − 1) n. Then, for each
problem (R,O′),
ϕ(R,O′) = fpi(R,O′ \ {y}).
Not two-agent consistent conflict resolving: Let pi and pi′ be two distinct strict orders of
agents in N . Then, for each problem (R,O′),
ϕ(R,O′) =
{




Not truncation invariant: Let N = {1, 2, 3}, O = {x, y}, x: 1 2 3, ′x: 2 1 3, and y: 3 1 2.
Let = (x,y) and ′= (′x,y). Then, for each problem (R,O′),
ϕ(R,O′) =
{
DA(R,O′) if ∅ P3 x and x ∈ O′ and
DA′(R,O′) otherwise.
Let R1 : x ∅ y, R2 : x ∅ y, R3 : y ∅ x, and R′3 : y x ∅. Let R = (R1, R2, R3) and R′ =
(R1, R2, R
′
3). Note that R3 is a truncation of R
′
3 and ϕ3(R, {x, y}) = y = ϕ3(R′, {x, y}). However,
ϕ1(R, {x, y}) = x and ϕ2(R′, {x, y}) = x; a contradiction of truncation invariance. Next, we show
two-agent consistent conflict resolution, and strategy-proofness for this mechanism.
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For two-agent consistent conflict resolution, consider (R,O′) and (R,O′′). Since the allocation
of y always follows the same priority order, two-agent consistent conflict resolution could only be
violated for x. But then x ∈ O′ and x ∈ O′′ and ϕ(R,O′) = ϕ(R,O′′).
For strategy-proofness, note that agents 1 and 2 cannot change the priority structure by re-
porting a false preference relation. Consider agent 3 and a problem (R,O′). Obviously, if |O′| = 1,
then agent 3 cannot profitably manipulate by reporting a false preference relation. Let O′ = {x, y}.
Now if agent 3’s first choice is y or ∅ (or agent 3 receives his first choice), then agent 3 receives his
first choice under (R,O′) and agent 3 cannot profitably manipulate. Let agent 3’s first choice be x.
If R3 : x ∅ y and agent 3 does not receive his first choice, then ϕ3(R, {x, y}) = ∅ and agent 3
can only change the priority structure by reporting a preference relation R′3 with ∅ P ′3 x. But then
by individual rationality, ϕ3((R−3, R′3), {x, y}) 6= x and agent 3 cannot profitably manipulate by
reporting a false preference relation.
If R3 : x y ∅ and agent 3 does not receive his first choice, then ϕ3(R, {x, y}) = y. Now the
same argument as above establishes that agent 3 can never receive x by reporting a false preference
relation.
Not strategy-proof : Let  be a priority structure. Then, the responsive DA-mechanism based on
the object-optimal matching that is obtained by using Gale and Shapley’s (1962) object-proposing
deferred-acceptance mechanism satisfies all properties except strategy-proofness.
E.2 Independence of Properties in Theorem 4
In the following we consider the house allocation model, i.e., for all x ∈ O, qx = 1. Therefore,
instead of denoting capacity vectors, we simply denote the set of available real objects, e.g., for
O′ ⊆ O, O′ 6= ∅, (R,O′) denotes a problem where one copy of each type in O′ is available.
For any strict order pi of agents in N , we denote the corresponding serial dictatorship mechanism
by fpi; for example, if pi : 1 2 . . . (n−1) n, then fpi works as follows: for each problem (R,O′) such
that R ∈ RN ′ , first agent minN ′ chooses his preferred object in O′, then agent minN ′ \ {minN ′}
chooses his preferred object from the remaining objects O′ \ {fpi1 (R,O′)}, etc. Note that for each
strict order pi of N , fpi = DApi where pi equals the priority order where for all x ∈ O, pix=
pi. Thus, each serial dictatorship mechanism fpi satisfies unassigned type invariance, individual
rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness.
The following examples establish the independence of the properties (properties not mentioned
in the examples follow easily).
Not unassigned type invariant: Ehlers and Klaus (2007, Example 1) introduce a mechanism
that violates unassigned type invariance, but satisfies efficiency and consistency (and the other
properties of Theorem 4).
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Not individually rational: Let pi : 1 2 . . . (n − 1) n. For each Rn ∈ R, let Rˆn be such that
A(Rˆn) = O and Rˆn|O = Rn|O. Then, for each problem (R,O′) such that R ∈ RN ′ ,
ϕ(R,O′) =
{
fpi((R−n, Rˆn), O′) if n ∈ N ′ and
fpi(R,O′) otherwise.
Not weakly non-wasteful: Fix an object y ∈ O and pi : 1 2 . . . (n − 1) n. Then, for each
problem (R,O′) such that R ∈ RN ′ ,
ϕ(R,O′) = fpi(R,O′ \ {y}).
Not weakly consistent: Let pi : 1 2 3 . . . (n− 1) n and pi′ : 1 n (n− 1) . . . 3 2. Then, for each
problem (R,O′) such that R ∈ RN ′ ,
ϕ(R,O′) =
{




Not strategy-proof : Let  be a priority structure. Then, the responsive DA-mechanism based on
the object-optimal matching that is obtained by using Gale and Shapley’s (1962) object-proposing
deferred-acceptance mechanism satisfies all properties except strategy-proofness.
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